But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation.
That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. But an thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points.
In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. He claims that we have no direct access to the noumena, but then he allows for this internal intuition, which could be nothing other than direct access to the noumena. In actuality this is simply inconsistency in Kant. As an internal intuition it is distinct from the phenomenal influence of sensation, and therefore must be a direct intuition of the noumena. Notice that Kant even describes the intuition of time as an "internal" intuition. So our intuitions of time may be derived from our direct access to the noumena through the apprehension of our own being, rather than what you describe, as the intuition of time being a medium between oneself and the noumena. Sure, but as I explained, it seems highly likely that the transcendental aesthetic is wrong instead. Thus, they are not given as they are in-themselves, but as they are in time. Those "intelligible objects" are given at minimum mediately, through the pure intuition of time. For example, given the transcendental aesthetic this is wrong.
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